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IV

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

:

Case No. 20020576-CA

vs.
ERNESTO HERNANDEZ,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2001), this Court has jurisdiction over
this case. This is an appeal from convictions for one count of Driving Under the Influence
of Alcohol with a Passenger Under Sixteen Years of Age, a class A misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(3)(a)(ii)(B) (1999), in the Third District Court, the
Honorable Ann Boyden presiding.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Do rules of statutory construction require merging the offense of Driving
Under the Influence of Alcohol with a Passenger under Sixteen Years of
Age with the offense of Reckless Driving? A trial court's interpretation

1

of statutory construction is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Bohne,
2002 UT 116, % 4, 63 P.3d 63, 64 ("We review the appellate court's
statutory interpretation for correctness.").

2. Does Utah's Shondel doctrine require the defendant's conviction of
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol with a Passenger under Sixteen
Years of Age, a class A misdemeanor, to be sentenced at the lower
offense of Reckless Driving, a class B misdemeanor? A trial court's
conclusions of law are afforded no deference and are reviewed for
correctness. See State v. Comer, 2002 UT App 219, f 12, 51 P.3d 55
("[W]e review a trial court's conclusions of law based on such facts under
a correctness standard, according no deference to the trial court's legal
conclusions.").
CONTROLLING STATUTES
1. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(3)(a)(ii)(B) (1999)
2. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45(l)(b) (Supp. 2002)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 30,2001, the defendant was charged with Driving Under the Influence of
Alcohol with a Passenger under Sixteen Years of Age, a class A misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(3)(a)(ii)(B) (1999) ("DUI statute"), and Failure to

2

Wear a Seat Belt, an infraction, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-182 (Supp. 2002).
R. 8. At trial, on June 10, 2002, before the Honorable Ann Boyden, the defendant
stipulated to the facts that supported these charges. The defendant also stipulated to
additional violations that were not formally charged by the State. R. 2. Specifically, he
stipulated to Speeding and Following a Vehicle at an Unsafe Distance. R. 2. Defendant
then moved to reduce all of the charges to Reckless Driving, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45(l)(b) (Supp. 2002) ("Reckless Driving statute")
arguing that the requirement of three or more moving traffic violations under the Reckless
Driving statute had been met. R. 3.
The defendant first argued the principles that underlie Utah's Shondel doctrine
require the court to sentence identical offenses with differing levels of punishment at the
lower level of punishment. R. 4. The defendant next argued that principles of statutory
construction required the court to find that the Reckless Driving statute incorporated the
Driving Under the Influence statute. R. 4-5. The State responded by arguing that Shondel
was inapplicable in this case because the two offenses punished different types of conduct,
and the statutes contained distinct elements. R. 5.
Judge Ann Boyden denied the defendant's motion. R. 8. Judge Boyden first found
that the offenses of Reckless Driving and Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol with a
Passenger Under the Age of Sixteen Years are not identical offenses, and are thus exempt
from consideration under Shondel

R. 8.
3

Furthermore, the defendant's statutory

construction argument was defective because the defendant had not been charged with
speeding or following a vehicle at an unsafe distance, and thus, the court could not
properly consider whether three or more traffic offenses had been committed by the
defendant. R. 8-9. Judge Boyden also found that even if the defendant had been charged
with the additional traffic offenses, that defendant's statutory construction argument failed
because the two statutes punish distinct offenses. R. 9.
Judge Boyden entered judgment, finding the defendant guilty of the offense of
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol with a Ppassenger Under the Age of Sixteen
Years, a class A misdemeanor. R. 13. Defendant was sentenced according to the statutory
terms. R. 14. Defendant appealed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant was charged on June 30, 2001 with the offenses of Driving Under the
Influence of Alcohol with a Passenger Under the Age of Sixteen Years and Failure to
Wear a Seat Belt. R. 8. Although not charged with the following offenses, the defendant
stipulated that he also committed the traffic violations of Speeding and Following Too
Closely. R. 2. The trial court found the defendant guilty of violating only the DUI statute.
R. 12. Defendant objected to a finding on this charge because he had stipulated that he
committed four traffic violations under Title 41, Chapter 6, Traffic Rules and Regulations
of the Utah Code, thus warranting a conviction under Utah's Reckless Driving statute
(Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45(l)(b) (Supp. 2002)), a class B misdemeanor. R. 6. Defendant
4

also argued that Utah's Shondel doctrine required the trial court to sentence the defendant
under the class B misdemeanor offense of Reckless Driving instead of the class A
misdemeanor offense of the DUI statute. R. 3-4. Judge Boyden denied defendant's
request because she found that the two statutes contained unique elements not found in the
other. R. 8. In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court found the
following:
1.

On June 30, 2001 Ernesto A. Hernandez, defendant did drive 82 miles per
hour in a 60 miles per hour posted zone;

2.

Defendant failed to wear his seat belt;

3.

Defendant followed the vehicle in front of his at an unsafe distance;

4.

Defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol with a breath alcohol
content of .155; and

5.

Defendant had his daughter in the car at the time who was under the age of
sixteen years.

Br. Aplt. at 6. The trial court's conclusions of law stated:
1. Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol requires unique elements, inconsistent with
those required for Reckless Driving.
2. Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol requires that the operator of a motor vehicle
be under the influence of alcohol or drugs whereas the crime of Reckless Driving
does not.
5

3. Additionally, in this case the defendant was charged with Driving under the
Influence of Alcohol with a Passenger Under Sixteen Years of Age in the vehicle.
A passenger under the age of sixteen in the vehicle is not an element of Reckless
Driving.
4. Because Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol does not require evidence of traffic
violations, although they may be used as contributing to a driving pattern, statutory
construction is not relevant or at issue.
Br. Aplt. at 6.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

The trial court properly found that the offense of Driving Under the Influence of

Alcohol with a Passenger Under the Age of Sixteen Years does not merge into the offense
of Reckless Driving. Rules of statutory construction require that statutes relating to the
same subject matter must be construed together in order to give effect to the legislative
intent. The defendant's interpretation would render the provisions under Title 41, Chapter
6, Traffic Offenses and Regulations of the Utah Code redundant and ineffectual.
2.

The trial court properly found the Shondel doctrine inapplicable in this case because

the offense of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol with a Passenger Under the Age of
Sixteen Years contains elements wholly distinct from those elements required under the
offense of Reckless Driving.

6

ARGUMENT
I.

DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL WITH A
PASSENGER UNDER THE AGE OF SIXTEEN YEARS DOES NOT
MERGE INTO THE OFFENSE OF RECKLESS DRIVING.
The defendant claims that Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol with a Passenger

Under the Age of Sixteen Years (Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(3)(a)(ii)(B) (1999)) ("DUI
statute"), a class A misdemeanor, merges into the offense of Reckless Driving (Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6-45(l)(b) (Supp. 2002)) ("Reckless Driving statute"), a Class B misdemeanor.
Br. Aplt. at 8. Specifically, the defendant argues that because the trial court, in finding
the defendant guilty of the offense of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol with a
Passenger Under the Age of Sixteen Years, found that the defendant committed four
moving traffic violations under Title 41, Chapter 6, Traffic Rules and Regulations, thus
warranting a conviction under the lesser offense of reckless driving. Br. Aplt. at 9.
Matters of statutory interpretation are reviewed for correctness. See State v. Bohne,
2002 UT 116, ^f 4, 63 P.3d 63, 64 ("We review the appellate court's statutory
interpretation for correctness." (citing Hous. Auth. of County of Salt Lake v. Snyder, 2002
UT28,tl0,44P.3d724).
Utah's statute that prohibits Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol with a
Passenger Under the Age of Sixteen Years states
(2)(a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a
vehicle within this state if the person ...
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(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at
the time of operation or actual physical control....
(3)(a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of
Subsection (2) is guilty of a ...
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person ...
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of the
offense
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a)(iii) and (3)(a)(ii)(B) (1999). Utah's Reckless Driving
statute also falls under Title 41 and Chapter 6 of the Utah Code and states u[a] person is
guilty of reckless driving who operates a vehicle while committing three or more moving
traffic violations under Title 41, Chapter 6, Traffic Rules and Regulations, in a series of
acts within a single continuous period of driving." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45(l)(b)
(Supp. 2002).
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[statutes are considered in pari materia
and thus must be construed together when they... have the same purpose or object." Utah
County v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1985). Additionally, when Utah courts
interpret statutes, their "primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the
legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute
was meant to achieve." State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, ^ 25,4 P.3d 795, 799-800 (citing to
Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177,184 (Utah 1998)). This analysis of plain language requires
Utah courts to "attempt to give each part of the provision a relevant and independent
meaning so as to give effect to all of its terms." Id. at 800 (quoting V-1 Oil Co. v. State
Tax Comm'n, 942 P.2d 906, 917 (Utah 1997)). The Utah Supreme Court stated that
8

"[wjhenever possible, statutes should be construed so that no portion is superfluous."
Beynon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge #1743, B.P.O.E., 854 P.2d 513, 518 n. 21 (Utah 1993).
This construction has been interpreted by Utah courts as a requirement to avoid
interpretations that render statutes redundant. See State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277,278
(Utah Ct. App. 1995). This requirement is based on the assumption that "every word in
the statute was chosen advisedly by the Legislature, [and therefore courts] resist
concluding it would have chosen redundant language." Id. at 279.
The defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to merge the driving
under the influence of alcohol statute into the reckless driving statute. Br. Aplt. at 11-12.
The State agrees with the defendant that statutes must be construed according to their
plain language and unambiguous language must not be interpreted to contradict the
statute's plain meaning. See Br. Aplt. at 9 (citing to State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, ^f 11,992
P.2d 986). However, the defendant's interpretation of the rules of statutory construction
actually contradicts the plain language of both the DUI statute and the Reckless Driving
statute. The defendant fails to consider the rule that statutes relating to the same subject
matter must be construed together. Under the defendant's interpretation, charges for
reckless driving would take the place of charges under Utah's DUI statute when three or
more traffic offenses occur. See Br. Aplt. at 12. This transformation of DUI offenses
into reckless driving offenses is absent from the plain language of the Reckless Driving
statute. Defendant's interpretation would make the DUI statute moot, and as previously
9

stated by this Court, redundant interpretations of statutes should be avoided. See
Candelario, 909 P.2d at 278.
Furthermore, defendant's interpretation runs contrary to the purpose and intent of
Title 41, Chapter 6, Traffic Rules and Regulations of the Utah Code. Statutes that have
the "same purpose or object" must be construed together in order to give effect to both
statutes. See Utah County, 699 P.2d at 709. In this case, this Court must construe the DUI
statute and the reckless driving statute together because "they have the same purpose or
object." Both statutes fall under the same section of the Utah Code: Title 41, Chapter 6,
Traffic Rules and Regulations. The defendant even concedes that the two statutes relate to
the same subject matter. See Br. Aplt. at 9. This chapter of the Motor Vehicle Act
exhibits a concern for regulating traffic for the public's safety.1
Under the defendant's construction DUI prosecutions of cases with three or more
traffic violations would cease. The Legislature did not intend such a result with the

1 For example, the Act regulates: obedience to traffic regulations (sections 41-6-11 to 19.5); traffic signs, signals and markings (sections 41-6-20 to -28); procedures to
follow when traffic accidents occur (sections 41-6-29 to -42); penalties for driving
while intoxicated or reckless driving (sections 41-6-43 to -45); speed restrictions for
vehicles (sections 41-6-46 to -52.7); rules of the road (sections 41-6-53 to -65); turns
and signals for stopping, starting or turning (sections 41-6-66 to -71); right-of-way
(sections 41-6-72 to -76.10); pedestrian rights and duties (sections 41-6-77 to -82.50);
bicycles (sections 41-6-83 to -90.5); railroad trains and safety zones (sections 41-6-91
to -94); special stops required by motor vehicles (sections 41-6-95 to -100.5); stopping,
standing and parking (sections 41-6-101 to -104); and miscellaneous statutes dealing
with the safety of motorists and pedestrians (sections 41-6-105 to -116.10); vehicle
safety equipment (sections 41-6-117 to -180); and safety belt usage (sections 41-6-181
to-186).
10

adoption of new language to the reckless driving statute. See Burns, 2000 UT 56, at f 25,
4 P.3d at 800 (The "primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative
intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to
achieve."). The defendant fails to explain how eliminating prosecutions under Utah's DUI
statutes would achieve securing the public's safety. In order to establish probable cause to
stop individuals suspected of driving under the influence, officers must find some
combination of traffic violations to warrant a stop. If the defendant's interpretation of the
reckless driving statute is upheld, then the State would have to charge a case as reckless
driving when an individual with a blood alcohol content greater than .08 commits three or
more traffic violations. This interpretation runs contrary to the purpose of Title 41,
Chapter 6, Traffic Rules and Regulations - regulating traffic for the public's safety. This
Court should decline defendant's request to merge the DUI statute into the reckless
driving statute.

11

II.

UTAH'S SHONDEL DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE EACH
STATUTE CONTAINS UNIQUE, DISTINCTIVE ELEMENTS.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "where there is doubt or uncertainty as to

which of two punishments is applicable to an offense an accused is entitled to the benefit
of the lesser." State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146, 148 (Utah 1969). The Utah Supreme
Court extended this holding by requiring that "the criminal laws must be written so that
there are significant differences between offenses and so that the exact same conduct is
not subject to different penalties depending upon which of two statutory sections a
prosecutor chooses to charge." State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d257,263 (Utah 1985). The Utah
Supreme Court has summarized the Shondel doctrine by stating "that if two statutes are
wholly duplicative as to the elements of the crime, the law does not permit a prosecutor to
exercise the wholly unfettered authority to decide whether the crime should be charged as
a misdemeanor or felony." Id, (emphasis added).
The Shondel doctrine does not apply to this case because the DUI statute and the
reckless driving statute contain elements that remain distinct from each other, and are
therefore not "wholly duplicative as to the elements of the crime." Id. The trial court
ruled correctly when it stated
I do find that... the driving under the influence of alcohol with a passenger
under 16 years of age in the vehicle are not identical [to the reckless
driving statute], that the additional elements of being required to have the
blood alcohol over a .08 or at least to the point where he is incapable of
operating the motor vehicle safely because of his influence -because of the
influence of the alcohol or the drugs is an additional element, and therefore
12

it is not an identical elements [sic], and the - of course with the additional
element of being with a passenger under 16 years of age at the time, I find
that there is no Shaundell [sic] problem here.
R. 8. Reckless driving requires the commission of three or more traffic offenses. See
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45(l)(b) (Supp. 2002). The DUI statute under which the
defendant was found guilty requires an operator to be under the influence of alcohol or
drugs, whereas the crime of reckless driving does not. Furthermore, the particular
provision of the DUI statute under which the defendant was found guilty requires the
additional element of a passenger under the age of sixteen years. See Utah Code Ann. §
41-6-44(3)(a)(ii)(B). The age and presence of a passenger is not an element of reckless
driving. Each statute addresses wholly distinctive behaviors from individuals accused of
crimes. For the foregoing reasons, the State requests that this Court deny the defendant's
appeal to find that the DUI statute prohibits same conduct barred under the reckless
driving statute.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED
Oral argument would not significantly aid the Court in deciding this case. Because
this case raises no novel question of law, a published opinion would make no useful
addition to the body of Utah law.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly determined that rules of statutory construction and the
Shondel doctrine do not require merging the offense of driving under the influence of
13

alcohol with a passenger under the age of sixteen years, a class A misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(3)(a)(ii)(B) (1999), into the offense of reckless
driving, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45(l)(b) (Supp.
2002). Statutes that relate to the same subject must be read in pari materia to give full
effect to the statute's purposes. Defendant's narrow construction would render nearly all
statutes under Title 41, Chapter 6, Traffic Rules and Regulations of the Utah Code
redundant and ineffectual. Additionally, defendant's Shondel argument fails because the
DUI statute and the reckless driving statute contain elements distinct from each other, and
each punishes wholly distinctive behavior.

Based on the foregoing, defendant's

conviction and sentence for driving under the influence of alcohol with a passenger under
the age of sixteen years should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted o n ^ f ^ March 2003.
DAVID YOCOM
Salt Lake County District Attorney

LTHERP4EJEETERS
JDepoty District Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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Utah Code Annotated
§ 41-6-44(2)(a)(iii) and (3)(a)(ii)(B) Driving under the influence of alcohol with a
passenger under the age of sixteen years,
(2)(a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a
vehicle within this state if the person ...
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at
the time of operation or actual physical control....
(3)(a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of
Subsection (2) is guilty of a ...
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person ...
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of the offense.

17

Utah Code Annotated
§ 41-6-45 Reckless Driving - Penalty,
(1) A person is guilty of reckless driving who operates a vehicle:
(a) in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property;
or
(b) while committing three or more moving traffic violations under Title 41,
Chapter 6, Traffic Rules and Regulations, in a series of acts within a single
continuous period of driving.
(2) A person who violates subsection (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.

18

ADDENDUM B
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DAVID E YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
KATHERINE PETERS, Bar No 9143
Deputy Distnct Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801)468-3422
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

)
ORDER

Plaintiff,
-vs-

)
v
Case No 015906524

ERNESTO A HERNANDEZ,

)

Defendant

)

Honorable Ann Boyden

The Court, having heard the stipulated tacts of this case and having heard argument by
both parties Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On June 30, 2001 Ernesto A Hernandez, defendant did drive 82 miles per hour in
a 60 mile per hour posted zone,

2.

Defendant failed to wear his seat belt,

3.

Defendant followed the vehicle in front of his at an unsafe distance,

4.

Defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol with a breath alcohol
content of .155 and

5.

Defendant had his daughter in the car at the time who was under the age of sixteen
years

ORDER
Case No 015906524
Page 2

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol requires unique elements, inconsistent
with those required for Reckless Driving

2

Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol requires that the operator of a motor
vehicle be under the influence of alcohol or drugs whereas the crime of Reckless
Dnvmg does not

3.

Additionally in this case the defendant was charged with Driving Under the
Influence of Alcohol with a passenger under sixteen years of age in the vehicle A
passengei under the dgc of sixteen in the vehicle is not an element of Reckless
Dming

4

Because Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol does not require evidence of
tiaffic violations, although they may be used as contributing to a driving pattern,
statutory constiuction is not relevant or at issue

ORDER
Case No. 015906524
Page 3

ORDER
It is hereby ordered that Defendant's Motion to find his client guilty of Reckless Driving
rather than the offenses of Driving under the Influence of Alcohol with a Passenger Under the
Age of Sixteen, Speeding, Failure to Wear a Safety Belt and Following too Closely is hereby
denied.
SIGNED this _^T day

of-jpaefxhl.

BY THE COURT:

'<z£c^e

HONORABLE ANN BOYDEN
Third Judicial District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM the Order on Defendant's Motion to Find the Defendant
Guilty of Reckless Driving this

day of June, 2002

BENJAMIN A. HAMILTON
Attorney for Defendant

ADDENDUM C
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 015906524
vs.
ERNESTO A. HERNANDEZ,
Defendant.

Trial
Electronically Recorded on
June 10, 2002
BEFORE:

THE HONORABLE ANN BOYDEN
Third District Court Judge

For the Plaintiff:

Katherine Peters
SL Dist Atty
2001 S. State #S3700
Salt Lake City, UT 84190
Telephone: (801)486-3422

For the Defendant:

Benjamin A. Hamilton
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on June 10, 2002)

3

THE COURT: The matter that I have —

I think the only

4

matter I have, other than the Vaughn matter, is this Hernandez

5

matter.

6
7

MR. HAMILTON: That's going to be a relatively short
matter.

I'm not going to do a full-blown trial, your Honor.

8

THE COURT: Okay.

9

MR. HAMILTON: What we're going to d o —

10

THE COURT: Mr. Hernandez, if you wish to —

do you

11

want to sit at the table?

12

interpreter, so you can pull a chair over by the defendant.

13

This is State vs. Ernesto Alejandro Hernandez. Mr. Hernandez

14

is here with Mr. Hamilton, and the matter was scheduled for a

15

bench trial.

16

the facts and it's legal argument that you wish to address.

17

Thank you. We do need the

I understand that you've stipulated to some of

MR. HAMILTON: Right. What we've stipulated to, your

18

Honor, is that if there were a trial or if witnesses were

19

sworn, that there would be testimony that would establish the

20

elements of driving under the influence, a class A misdemeanor

21

because of the child being in the vehicle. The elements would

22

also be met about speeding.

23

with following too closely, even though these charges are not

24

filed, it will be become important as I make an argument as to

25

the issues I'm going to be arguing.

The elements would also be met
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1

THE COURT:

Okay.

2

MR. HAMILTON:

There would also be the elements that

3

would be established for a seat belt violation.

4

of those violations constitute —

5

Chapter 6, and about a year ago, the reckless driving statute

6

was modified, and the reckless driving statute had added

7

elements placed on it and another subsection added.

8
9

Now all four

are found under Title 41

Instead of just being the possibility of finding
somebody guilty of reckless driving for driving with a

10

willful disregard for the safety of persons or property, the

11

legislature added another prong in the alternative that if

12

while committing —

13

operates a vehicle while committing three or more moving

14

traffic violations under Title 41 Chapter 6, so we've

15

stipulated to facts that would establish the elements of four

16

offenses that are under Title 41 Chapter 6.

17

a person guilty of reckless driving, if he

Now there are two ways that we are asking the Court to

18

find that the defendant be guilty only at this point of

19

reckless driving and not the four violations underlying the

20

reckless driving offense. The first of those arguments is that

21

under Shaundell —

22

146, a Utah Supreme Court case from 1969.

State vs. Shaundell, it's found at 453 P.2d

23

What Shaundell held was that if there are two statutes

24

where the elements of the crimes are identical, then the person

25

can only be convicted of the lesser of the statutes — lesser
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offense.

2

In the Shaundell case it was a case of possession of

3

LSD, and there were two statutes under which the person could

4

have been convicted under Shaundell. One was a class B

5

misdemeanor and one was a third degree felony, and our Supreme

6

Court said that if there's an option to charge under two

7

different statutes where the elements are identical, then the

8

State must only choose the lesser, and the Court could only

9

convict under the lesser.

10

So our contention is that the reckless driving

11

statute incorporates the identical elements of the statutes

12

that Mr. Hernandez is guilty of —

13

too closely and the seat belt violation.

14

incorporating them, they are identical in nature. The elements

15

are exactly the same, and under the Shaundell decision this

16

Court is now obligated to convict Mr. Hernandez only under the

17

reckless driving statute.

speeding and DUI, following
Therefore by

18

The alternative argument to that is that under the

19

rules of statutory construction, if there is a statute that

20

clearly incorporates another statute, it takes precedence over

21

that other statute, and the Court is required to follow that

22

statute.

23

This statute of the reckless driving, 41-6-45, clearly

24

incorporates the entire chapter of Title 41 Chapter 6, and

25

therefore, if he's guilty of any moving traffic violations —
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three or more moving traffic violations then he's guilty of

2

reckless driving.

3

That is the clear legislative intent.

The plain

4

language of the statute is that that's the only thing he can

5

then be guilty of, and the Court is now obligated the follow

6

the statute and convict him only of that offense of reckless

7

driving.

8

THE COURT:

9

MS. PETERS:

Thank you.

Response?

Thank you, your Honor.

Under State vs.

10

Clark, 1981 case, the Court stated that if the elements of the

11

crime are not identical and the appurtenant statutes require

12

proof of some fact or element not required to establish the

13

other then the statutes do not describe the same conduct and

14

the defendant may be charged with the crime carrying the more

15

severe sentence.

16

In this case, a DUI is a more severe sentence because

17

there are different elements that the defendant must —

excuse

18

me, that the State must prove.

19

State vs. Shaundell, they need to be identical elements.

20

elements are not identical for a DUI for a seat belt violation,

21

for driving too close —

22

speeding.

23

Shaundell.

As Mr. Hamilton stated, under
The

excuse me, following too close and for

So therefore, I don't believe that this falls under

24

THE COURT:

Thank you.

25

MR. HAMILTON:

Any further argument?

In response to that, your Honor, the
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1

elements are identical because statutes are incorporated in,

2

and therefore if he's guilty of those three —

3

those three statutes, he's guilty of reckless driving.

4

of the elements of those crimes are met, then he's guilty of

5

reckless driving, therefore the elements are identical.

(inaudible)
If all

6

I think where the State has a problem is that because

7

this is a DUI case and a reckless driving, while it is still a

8

class B misdemeanor, does not have the minimum mandatory

9

sentence requirements, they believe that it should not be

10

brought down to the reckless driving, and that's the sticky

11

point.

12

However, in looking at the plain language of the

13

statute, there is not a way around —

14

around the fact that these are identical.

15

guilty of three or more traffic violations — moving traffic

16

violations in violation of Title 41 Chapter 6, that equals a

17

DUI —

18

that's what the statute says, and that's what's required.

19

Court is obligated to follow that, and the State didn't even

20

respond to that aspect of the argument.

21

there is not a way to get
It's if they are

or reckless driving. That's the end of the story,
The

Therefore, what we have is a situation where the

22

statute dictates what should be done, and the Court is

23

obligated to do it, just as if this were a situation of three

24

lesser traffic offenses. If that were the case the Court would

25

be obligated to convict the individual of reckless driving.
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1

It doesn't — the statute doesn't distinguish between

2

lesser or minor traffic violations or serious traffic

3

violations. It says if it's a moving traffic violation under

4

this title and chapter, it equals reckless driving.

5

THE COURT: I know that we're going back and forth,

6

but we've weighed the evidence and you didn't address the

7

second (inaudible).

8
9

MS. PETERS: Again, your Honor, the State just wanted
to reiterate that the DUI is —

especially in this case — is a

10

more severe charge. The defendant was impaired, he had a child

11

present, and these elements are not found under the reckless

12

statute. He is — this is a DUI, it's a different —

13

different charge, and the elements are not the same, and it's

14

not incorporated under reckless.

15

chapter, but it's not —

16

not meant to be taken, I believe, under Shaundell.

17

MR. HAMILTON:

this is a

It may be in the same

the elements are different and it's

In response to that, your Honor, if he

18

were not guilty of DUI then he would be not be able to be

19

convicted under reckless driving under 45. We're saying yeah,

20

he is guilty of the DUI, we're admitting that. We're

21

stipulating to the facts that would establish the elements of

22

that offense.

23

other two, he is also guilty of the reckless driving statute,

24

and the way the statute is written, he has to be convicted

25

under the reckless driving statute.

But it's because he is guilty of that and the
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THE COURT: All right, thank you.

I've heard the

2

argument that has been made by both attorneys.

As to argument

3

number one, the Shaundell issue, I do find that the elements of

4

the crime as charged in this case, the driving under the

5

influence of alcohol with a passenger under 16 years of age in

6

the vehicle are not identical, that the additional elements of

7

being required to have the blood alcohol over a .08 or at least

8

to the point where he is incapable of operating the motor

9

vehicle safely because of his influence — because of the

10

influence of the alcohol or the drugs is an additional element,

11

and therefore it is not an identical elements, and the — and

12

of course with the additional element of being with a passenger

13

under 16 years of age at the time, I find that there is no

14

Shaundell problem there.

15

familiar with the elements that are involved, and find that

16

there is not a Shaundell problem.

I'm familiar with the Shaundell case,

17

As to the statutory construction argument made by

18

defense Counsel, I also am not persuaded by that, Counsel.

19

Mr. Hernandez is charged with driving under the influence of

20

alcohol and failure to wear a seat belt. The fact that he

21

comes in and pleads guilty or admits charges that have not even

22

been charged does not then make the statutory construction an

23

issue for this Court.

24
25

He is simply charged with driving under the influence
and with failure to wear the safety belt, and he may plead
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guilty or not guilty to those as he chooses, but he does not

2

get to come in and say, "I also want to plead guilty to

3

different charges that have not even been charged," or

4

additional charges that have not even been charged and then

5

argue the statutory construction to say that he's now been

6

found guilty of so many traffic offenses that it makes the

7

reckless driving (inaudible).

8
9

So —

and specifically under these facts I find that

the defense argument fails. I also find that the statutory

10

construction argument would fail as a whole, that because the

11

DUI does require different and additional elements and not just

12

the violation of the traffic. The violation of traffic — the

13

traffic offenses may in fact be evidence that a defendant is

14

driving under the influence, but that is not the sole element,

15

and that is not the sole finding that must be made in a

16

conviction.

17

A conviction for DUI is that the driving was such that

18

the defendant was under the influence of alcohol or drugs and

19

could not capably safely — was not capable of safely driving

20

the vehicle.

21

evidence of traffic violations that are not charged and are not

22

prudent and are not even required to be proven while that may

23

be part of the evidence, they are not required to be proven, it

24

does not bring into issue for me either the statutory

25

construction argument or the Shaundell argument. So I am

Just the fact that that involved as evidence
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denying the defendant's motion 1to have these reduced 'to the

2

reckless driving.
MR . HAMILTON: I would like to make a record on one

3
4

point, your Honor.

That is you ruled that because it wasn't

5 ' charged the matter was not proper argued to be made.

It is a

6

lesser included offense, your Honor, and if we had a jury trial

7

(inaudible) we would ask the Court to consider the lesser

8

included offense and to ask for the construction of a lesser

9

included, and therefore I believe that the argument should and

10

could be made here at this point after the receiving of the

11

proffered evidence or stipulated-to facts.
In addition to that, if the Court is finding, based on

12
13

what the Court has indicated, that the DUI has added elements

14

that include an incapability of safely operating a vehicle, if

15

the Court is ruling based on that, then we're going to ask the

16

Court to dismiss or find Mr. Hernandez was not guilty of the

17

other traffic violations if the Court is going to find him

18

guilty of DUI, because that is simply evidence of the DUI and

19

the incapability of safely operating the vehicle,
THE COURT: He's not charged with it so I haven't

20
21

found him guilty or not guilty—

22

MR. HAMILTON:

23

THE COURT: So you still want that clear on the

24
25

record.

That's right, he wasn't.

All right, you've made—
MR. HAMILTON:

But your Honor, I do want to put on the
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record as far as the lesser included offense of the reckless

2

driving.

3

THE COURT: That's true. My ruling on this was

4

under —

specifically under this case he is not charged with

5

them, so they were not part of the statutory construction

6

argument, and even if they were — had been charged, I do find

7

that because there are additional elements that the statutory

8

construction argument also does not hold because with the

9

additional elements that are required for a DUI, and for the

10

record, because as you state on the record that the driving

11

under the — the defendant being incapable of safely driving is

12

only one of an alternative element for a DUI, that the

13

additional element of either driving under the influence to the

14

extent that the defendant is not capable of safely driving or

15

driving with a blood alcohol of .08 or greater, those are

16

additional elements and therefore the Shaundell and the

17

statutory construction arguments fail.

18

Is the record clear that way?

The State will need to

19

prepare those findings and make a —

20

you need to for that. All right, thank you.

21

get a copy of the tape if

That does bring us to the point, then, where the

22

defendant has been — has admitted guilt to the DUI as a class

23

A because a passenger was involved in there. The record also

24

should reflect that that was an additional element that I

25

stated for this class A misdemeanor.

The argument, I think,
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was that (inaudible) DUI is a class B, but it was as a class A

2

with the child being present as well.

3

The seat belt infraction was an additional charge that

4

was not —

5

speeding, and I am going to therefore find that it is included

6

as well, so that the only guilty — the only conviction I'm

7

dealing with is Count I, driving under the influence as a class

8

A with a minor; is that correct?

9
10

the traffic charge that was argued as far as

MS. PETERS: Yes.
THE COURT:

11

Mr. Hamilton?

12

admit to that.

13

How do you wish me to address this,

The argument was simply that he was going to
I can take that—

MR. HAMILTON:

Well, we've stipulated to the evidence,

14

so we would —

15

based on the stipulation.

16
17

I suppose the Court would find him now guilty

THE COURT: To the evidence rather than having him
come up and enter a plea because—

18

MR. HAMILTON:

19

THE COURT:

That's right.

—it is based on that.

All right, and I

20

think that is clear, unless there's anything further that the

21

State has, that the stipulated evidence was that the evidence

22

would show that he had — was driving under the influence of

23

alcohol and that a child under the age of 16, I believe, is the

24

element was under the — 1 6 years of age was present in the

25

vehicle at the time. That is a class A misdemeanor.
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Having found the defendant upon that stipulated

2

evidence guilty of that class A misdemeanor, we need to address

3

sentencing.

4

presentence information?

5
6

Is this something that we need to get some

MR. HAMILTON:

We would

like to waive time and ask that sentence be imposed today.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. HAMILTON:

9

He has no priors, your Honor.

Was there an accident here?
No, there was a breath alcohol content

of .15.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. HAMILTON:

12

THE COURT:

13

offense.

14

sentencing goes?

.15 and no history.
No.

So this would be treated as a first

Does the State have anything further as far as

15

MS. PETERS:

16

THE COURT:

No, your Honor.
I think it is appropriate, then, that if

17

the defendant wishes to waive that we can sentence at this time

18

based on that, and that will at least put the defendant in a

19

position to be pursuing any further remedies on this case.

20
21

Mr. Hernandez, is there anything else you'd like me to
know before I sentence you on this class A charge?

22

MR. HERNANDEZ:

23

THE COURT:

24
25

No.

No jail time been spent on this as well

(inaudible) citations.
MR. HERNANDEZ:

No, I'm not, your Honor.
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THE COURT:

All right, thank you. Mr. Hernandez, I am

2

going to sentence you on the class A following the mandatory

3

but minimum requirements and sentences as a first offense.

4

Because it is a class A, I am going to impose 180 days jail.

5

I'm going to suspend all but the mandatory two days jail, give

6

you credit for the one day that you already spent in jail, and

7

because there was no accident, even though there is a class A

8

and a child was present, I — you have served one day in jail,

9

and I will go ahead and allow you to do the remaining day

10

additional 24 hours of community service.

11

The rest is suspended and you are on probation to ISA

12

for a period of 12 months. You will need to pay the minimum

13

fine of $1500 in fines and fees.

14

You will also need to complete the DUI series and the victim

15

impact series because a passenger was involved in this case —

16

not series but class with the victim impact portion.

17

supervise that and get you into the courses.

18

That includes a surcharge.

ISA will

The cost of the classes and the cost of supervision

19

may be credited towards the $1500 fine. $100 a month minimum

20

fine beginning on the last day of July and the last day of

21

every month.

22

that you're paying towards ISA so that it may be credited as

23

well.

24
25

Make sure that you're keeping track of the money

The blood alcohol was below the .16, it was .15, so I
will not need to address the (inaudible).

Is there anything
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else that I need to address on this before sentencing can be

2

completed so that the case is in a position to be done with.

3

Mr. Hamilton?

4

MR. HAMILTON:

No, your Honor, but if he does decide

5

to appeal, can we approach the Court at that point and ask that

6

the sentence be stayed pending the outcome of the appeal?

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. HAMILTON:

9
10

You may approach me with that, yes.
(Inaudible) confer with Counsel before

doing "that, is that something we can do?
THE COURT:

Thank you.

If you're going to do it, and

11

I assume that if there is going to be an appeal they're going

12

to want the findings of fact which have been —

13

prepare as well, but I have no problem with your —

14

State have any objection if this is appealed with my staying

15

the sentence pending that appeal?

16

MS. PETERS:

17

THE COURT:

I requested you
does the

No, your Honor.
Since I haven't imposed any immediate jail

18

time that seems appropriate, and if that is the case you may

19

just approach me with a written motion to that effect.

20

MR. HAMILTON:

Thank you, your Honor.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. HAMILTON:

23

(Hearing concluded)

Thank you.
That's all I have.
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